Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can Customary International Law Be Improved? by Bradley, Curtis A. & Gulati, Mitu
421
CURTIS A . BRADLEY & MITU GULATI
Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can 
Customary International Law Be Improved?
Although customary international law (CIL) has historically been one of 
the principal forms of international law, it is plagued by debates and 
uncertainties about its proper sources, its content, its usefulness, and its 
normative attractiveness.1 While some of these debates and uncertainties are 
longstanding, they have intensified in recent years, in part because of the rise of 
multilateral treaty-making, which allows nations collectively to negotiate and 
codify broad areas of international law instead of relying on unwritten custom. 
Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that CIL is structurally unable 
to address many of the world’s most pressing problems, such as (to name a 
few) nuclear proliferation, global warming, and international financial 
stability. Perhaps most fundamentally, there “is no coherent or agreed upon 
theory to justify [CIL’s] role or explain its doctrine.”2 For these and other 
reasons, CIL is “under attack from all sides.”3
In light of the current state of CIL, it is worth thinking creatively about 
how to improve this body of international law. One difference between the way 
that many treaties are structured and the way that CIL is structured concerns 
withdrawal rights. The conventional wisdom among international law scholars 
is that, once a rule of CIL becomes established, no nation has the legal right to 
withdraw from the rule. Instead, if a nation wants to change a rule of CIL, 
1. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
66 U CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1117-18 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International 
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 123-31 (2005); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary 
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000).
2. Guzman, supra note 1, at 117.
3. Id. at 116.
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either it must convince other nations to enter into a treaty overriding the rule, 
or it must violate the rule and hope that other nations will acquiesce to the 
violation. This regime applies even to nations that enter the international 
system after a CIL rule is formed. In a recent article, Withdrawing from 
International Custom, we referred to this conventional wisdom as the 
“Mandatory View” of CIL.4
In contrast to the Mandatory View, many treaties, even those that address 
fundamental issues of international public policy, expressly allow for unilateral 
withdrawal, sometimes conditioned on a notice period.5 In addition, other 
treaties are thought to allow for withdrawal by implication—as a function, for 
example, of their subject matter. Furthermore, even when a treaty does not 
expressly or implicitly allow for withdrawal, a nation may have the legal right 
to terminate the treaty as a result of developments such as a material breach of 
the treaty by another party or a fundamental change of circumstances. We 
suggested in Withdrawing that the contrast between the extensive and variable 
exit rights under treaties and the purported lack of any exit rights under CIL 
was puzzling and deserved study, especially given the overlap that exists today 
between the content of treaties and of CIL and the frequent reference to treaties 
as evidence of CIL.6
We then turned in Withdrawing to a consideration of history. The 
Mandatory View, we explained, was not always the canonical understanding of 
CIL. Some of the classic publicists on international law, such as Emmerich de 
Vattel, thought that nations had the legal right to withdraw from some rules of 
international custom, a proposition that we referred to as the “Default View” of 
CIL.7 Also, a number of the U.S. Supreme Court’s early international law 
decisions assumed such a Default View.8 We attempted to discern when the 
intellectual shift to the Mandatory View occurred, and we suggested that the 
shift—at least in the international law treatises—may have taken place most 
sharply in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9 We also found 
4. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J.
202 (2010).
5. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005).
6. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 204-05.
7. See id. at 216-19. International legal historian Antony Anghie describes Vattel’s treatise as 
“arguably the most influential book ever written on the subject of international law.” 
Antony Anghie, Vattel, Imperialism, and the Rights of Indigenous People (Feb. 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
8. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 219-26.
9. See id. at 226-29.
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indications that the shift may have been related in part to efforts to bind new 
states to customary rules that had been established by Western powers.10
We did not argue that this history dictated any particular conclusions about 
how CIL should operate today. Instead, we noted that it “shows that the 
Mandatory View is not the only possible approach to CIL, and that an 
international legal system could potentially operate despite the allowance of 
some CIL withdrawal rights.”11 The remainder of Withdrawing was dedicated 
to an examination of the functional desirability of the Mandatory View. We 
found little explanation for the Mandatory View in the literature and thus were 
compelled to speculate about its justifications. Drawing upon scholarship in 
the areas of contract theory, corporate law, voting rights, and constitutional 
design, we concluded that reasonable arguments could be made for disallowing 
exit with respect to those areas of CIL that address significant interstate 
externalities or agency problems but that it was difficult to justify a 
disallowance of opt-out rights across the board for all of CIL.12
Finally, we suggested that allowing for withdrawal rights under CIL could 
help revitalize this body of international law.13 Withdrawal rights would make 
it easier for states to innovate in addressing modern problems because the 
additional flexibility provided by such rights would lower the cost of creating 
new rules of CIL as well as the cost of pushing for alterations to existing rules. 
In addition, the invocation of withdrawal rights would help provide 
information to the international system about the position of nations on both 
the content of particular CIL rules and their level of commitment to them. 
Furthermore, providing a lawful avenue for exiting from CIL rules in the face 
of changed circumstances would increase the likelihood of collective 
enforcement of such rules against states that have not exercised the right of 
withdrawal since the line between breach and exit would be more sharply 
delineated.
Withdrawing challenges conventional wisdom, so it is not surprising that it 
has generated strong reactions. The scholars who have written responses in 
The Yale Law Journal Online—Lea Brilmayer, Bill Dodge, David Luban, Isaias 
Tesfalidet, and Carlos Vázquez—critique our analysis on a number of grounds. 
In this Essay, we attempt to address these criticisms, while also highlighting 
areas of research that might help move the debate forward. Throughout the 
Essay, we emphasize a recurring theme, which is the need to improve and 
10. See id. at 230-31.
11. Id. at 226.
12. See id. at 254-69.
13. See id. at 242-52.
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revitalize CIL. Before proceeding, we want to express our gratitude to the 
respondents for engaging with our project and to The Yale Law Journal for 
facilitating this dialogue.14
In Part I, we discuss the endorsement of the Default View by some of the 
classic international law publicists, including Vattel. In Part II, we consider the 
shift in the international law treatises to a Mandatory View of CIL and the 
potential connections between that shift and colonialism. In Part III, we revisit 
the modern disparity in withdrawal rights between treaties and CIL. Finally, in 
Part IV, we address a number of functional considerations that are relevant in 
choosing between the Default and Mandatory Views.
i . vattel and the shift away from the default view
In Withdrawing, we explained that a number of the classic international law 
publicists, such as Vattel, thought that nations could unilaterally withdraw 
from some rules of CIL. We also explained that this Default View was reflected 
in some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s early and most famous international law 
decisions, such as Ware v. Hylton and Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.15 Bill 
Dodge and David Luban acknowledge this history but point out, as we did in 
Withdrawing, that Vattel and other publicists still thought that many rules of 
CIL, most notably rules based on natural law, were mandatory.16 Somewhat 
confusingly, Vattel labeled these rules based on natural law the “voluntary law 
of nations” to distinguish them from those rules that were subject to unilateral 
withdrawal, which he named the “customary law of nations.”17
It is worth pausing to note the significance of this agreement between the 
respondents and ourselves. In discussing CIL and its history, not one modern 
14. For additional discussion of the project, see Symposium, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 
(2010). For our response to the papers in that symposium, see Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu 
Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010).
15. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 219-23.
16. See William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: Some Lessons from 
History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169, 173-74 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/12/17/
dodge.html; David Luban, Opting Out of the Law of War: Comments on Withdrawing from 
International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 151, 158 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/
12/8/luban.html; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 217-18 (explaining that Vattel did 
not think nations could withdraw from the “voluntary” law of nations).
17. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, intro., 
§§ 21, 25, at 8 (photo. reprint 1993) (James Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., 
Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
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casebook or treatise acknowledges that there was ever a Default View. 
Moreover, scholars who have otherwise relied on early publicists such as Vattel 
seem to be unaware of the publicists’ endorsements of the Default View. In 
addition, debates in foreign relations law scholarship often depend on 
understandings of the early Supreme Court cases, and yet no one in those 
debates has realized that some of these decisions assumed a Default View.
While agreeing with our basic claim about the history, Dodge contends 
that the scope of what Vattel thought was encompassed by the Default View 
was relatively insignificant. For Vattel, says Dodge, the voluntary law of 
nations (which was mandatory) “completely overshadowed” the customary law 
of nations, which was “merely interstitial.”18 Dodge’s position is not necessarily 
inconsistent with what we wrote in Withdrawing, since we made no claims 
there about the scope of the Default View, in Vattel’s writing or otherwise. In 
any event, a close reading of Vattel’s treatise suggests that his understanding of 
the role of the Default View was more robust than what Dodge describes.
In categorizing international law, one of Vattel’s postulates was that 
nations generally have freedom of action, so long as they do not interfere with 
the “perfect rights” of other nations. Thus, said Vattel, “[a] Nation is therefore 
free to act as it pleases, so far as its acts do not affect the perfect rights of 
another Nation, and so far as the Nation is under merely internal obligations 
without any perfect external obligation.”19 Perfect rights, in Vattel’s view, 
concerned certain fundamental matters, such as territorial sovereignty, freedom 
of navigation on the high seas, and the ability to conduct diplomatic relations.
The breach of these rights provided a just cause for war.20 Many rights under 
international law, however, were imperfect, and they were still considered 
binding.21 Moreover, Vattel said that “care must be taken not to extend [perfect 
rights] so as to prejudice the liberty of Nations.”22
It was against this backdrop that Vattel describes what he means by the 
customary law of nations. He explains that this body of law consists of “rules 
18. Dodge, supra note 16, at 173-74.
19. VATTEL, supra note 17, intro., § 20, at 7.
20. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009). Violations of perfect rights provided a legal justification for 
war, whereas violations of imperfect rights did not. See VATTEL, supra note 17, intro., § 20, at 
7; id. bk. III, § 26, at 243-44.
21. See, e.g., H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (photo. reprint 2000) (1861) (“[A] right 
is no less a right because it belongs to the class called imperfect in international law; so of a 
duty, it is none the less obligatory because it is imperfect, and cannot be enforced under the 
rules of international jurisprudence.”).
22. VATTEL, supra note 17, intro., § 23, at 8.
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and customs, consecrated by long usage and observed by Nations as a sort of 
law” and that it “is founded upon a tacit consent, or rather upon a tacit 
agreement of the Nations which observe it.”23 Such a customary rule was 
binding on nations “so long as they have not expressly declared their 
unwillingness to follow it any longer.”24 Although Vattel noted that this 
category of international law encompasses customs that “are indifferent in 
nature,”25 by “indifferent” Vattel did not mean that the custom was 
insignificant. Rather, he meant that the custom was not “unjust or unlawful.”26
Importantly, Vattel makes clear that he is not attempting in his treatise to 
catalogue the various customary rules and instead limits himself to “stating the 
general theory of it.”27 As it turns out, in a number of places in his treatise he 
does refer to particular rules as falling within the customary category. For 
example, he treats a nation’s obligation to allow enemy citizens to leave its 
territory upon declaring war as a customary obligation, explaining that this 
obligation exists because the enemy citizens came into the territory “in reliance 
upon the public faith; for in permitting them to enter his territory and to reside 
there the sovereign impliedly promised them full liberty and security for their 
return home.”28 Similarly, he treats consular immunity as falling within the 
customary law of nations.29 In addition, Vattel often describes particular areas 
of international law as involving a mixture of the voluntary law of nations and 
the customary law of nations.30 Furthermore, even when classifying something 
23. Id., intro., § 25, at 8.
24. Id., intro., § 26, at 9.
25. Id.
26. Id., intro., § 25, at 9.
27. Id., intro., § 25, at 8.
28. See id., bk. III, § 63, at 256.
29. See, e.g., id., bk. II, § 34, at 125. In his introduction to this edition of Vattel’s treatise, Albert 
de Lapradelle explains that, “[h]aving only the imperfect duty of receiving consuls, Nations 
who receive them have the power of refusing them the necessary immunities.” Albert de 
Lapredelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES 
OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF 
SOVEREIGNS xix (photo. reprint 1993) (James Brown Scott ed., George B. Gregory trans., 
Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
30. In his discussion of the international law governing the treatment of neutral nations, for 
example, Vattel refers to both “certain practices [that] have become customary among 
civilized Nations” as well as “the rules of the natural Law of Nations.” VATTEL, supra note 17, 
bk. III, § 109, at 269. After elaborating upon what he thought natural law required with 
respect to neutrality, Vattel then returns to ordinary custom when discussing contraband 
goods on neutral ships, noting that he was describing rules for which “there seems to be 
fairly general agreement among European Nations.” Id., bk. III, § 111, at 271.
mandatory versus default rules
427
as falling within the voluntary law of nations, Vattel often falls back on 
reasoning grounded in tacit consent rather than on natural law. He does so, for 
example, when discussing ambassadorial immunity.31
Vattel also returns to his general theory of the customary law of nations in 
the portion of his treatise that discusses the privileges and immunities of 
ambassadors and other public ministers. He explains that if a nation:
happens to find at a later time that the custom is disadvantageous, it is 
free to declare that it is unwilling to abide by such a custom; and once it 
has clearly made known its intention there is no room for complaint on 
the part of others if it does not observe the custom.32
He makes clear here that this Default View applies “not only in matters relating 
to ministers, but also in other matters in general.”33
In sum, while not the principal focus of his treatise, there is no indication 
that Vattel viewed the customary law of nations as insignificant in the way that 
Dodge suggests. Nor did other classic publicists who endorsed the Default 
View, such as Burlamaqui, Bynkershoek, or Martens, view it as insignificant.34
Moreover, as Dodge acknowledges,35 Vattel’s endorsement of the Default View 
31. Vattel explains that “it is impossible to believe that it is the intention of the prince who 
sends an ambassador, or any other minister, to subject him to the authority of a foreign 
power.” Id., bk. IV, § 92, at 376. As a result, he reasons that:
If it can not be reasonably presumed that the sovereign of the minister would 
consent to subject him to the authority of the sovereign to whom he is sent, the 
latter, in receiving the minister, consents to receive him upon that footing of 
independence; and this constitutes between the two princes a tacit convention 
which gives a new force to the natural obligation.
Id.
32. Id., bk. IV, § 106, at 385-86.
33. Id., bk. IV, § 106, at 385 (emphasis added).
34. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 217. Luban contends that Burlamaqui thought that 
customary rules of international law were not binding. See Luban, supra note 16, at 158. 
Luban cites no secondary literature endorsing that contention, and it does not appear to be 
supported by the text of Burlamaqui’s treatise, which refers to CIL rules as “obligatory” and 
maintains that nations are “reasonably supposed to submit to those customs, so long as they 
have not made any declaration to the contrary.” J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
LAW IN WHICH THE TRUE SYSTEMS OF MORALITY AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT ARE ESTABLISHED
199 (Nugent trans., Dublin, John Rice 1791) (1718) (emphasis added).
35. See Dodge, supra note 16, at 170, 171.
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was influential in both international law commentary in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries as well as in early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.36
Dodge also takes issue with our suggestion that the intellectual shift to the 
Mandatory View may have occurred most sharply in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. He contends, rather, that the Mandatory View 
developed “not at the turn of the twentieth century, but during the middle of 
the nineteenth.”37 The precise timing of the shift, while of obvious historical 
interest, is not particularly material for our project. Our main point was that, 
unbeknownst to most modern commentators, there was once a Default View
for some rules of CIL. In any event, the evidence that Dodge advances in 
support of his mid-nineteenth century temporal claim is thin. He notes that 
some commentators as early as the mid-1800s, most notably the British 
publicist Richard Wildman, had a more mandatory conception of CIL than did 
Vattel, but he does not dispute that other important treatises continued to 
support the Default View throughout the remainder of the nineteenth 
century.38 Although Dodge suggests that Henry Halleck’s 1861 treatise adopted 
the Mandatory View,39 in fact Halleck relied on Vattel’s framework, including 
the right to opt out of some rules of CIL, and this reliance continued up 
36. Luban contends that in two of these decisions, Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), 
and Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), the Supreme Court was 
expressing the view that the customary rules of international law in question were not 
binding. See Luban, supra note 16, at 158-59. This claim is unsupported by anything other 
than Luban’s own reading of the decisions and appears to be inconsistent with what we 
know about the Supreme Court’s views of CIL at the relevant times. Cf. Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and 
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, 
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”).
37. Dodge, supra note 16, at 186; see also id. at 180 (arguing that the shift to the Mandatory View 
“developed much earlier” than 1905); cf. William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, 
Congress, and the Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531, 551 (Pieter H.F. 
Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds., 2010) (claiming that “[b]y the turn of the 
twentieth century, the customary law of nations was no longer optional”).
38. See Dodge, supra note 16, at 182; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 219 & n.66. Dodge 
also cites The Scotia, 81 U.S. (1 Wall.) 170 (1871), as endorsing the Mandatory View, but that 
case is distinguishable on a number of grounds. Among other things, it involved the 
obligations of private parties under general maritime standards that had been accepted by 
the United States, see id. at 183, not public international law obligations imposed on the 
United States, and the Court was using the “common consent” idea simply to make clear 
that no one nation could dictate the standards on the high seas, not to disallow a nation 
from opting out of a custom in its own territory, see id. at 184.
39. Dodge, supra note 16, at 183.
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through the 1908 edition of Halleck’s treatise.40 In addition, as we discussed in 
Withdrawing, the “voluntarist” school of international law, which was 
influential at least up until World War II, was in substantial tension with the 
Mandatory View. And there were continuing challenges to the Mandatory 
View even in the post-World War II period (from developing countries and the 
Soviet bloc, in particular).41 Dodge does not address, let alone contest, these 
points.
Dodge does respond to one twentieth century development that we 
discussed—the shift from an absolute approach to sovereign immunity to a 
restrictive approach whereby nations have immunity in foreign courts only for 
their public, sovereign acts and not their private, commercial acts. As noted in 
Withdrawing, nations shifted away from the absolute approach without being 
viewed as violators of CIL, and without the need for a treaty, suggesting that 
the Default View may have continued to operate in practice for some areas of 
CIL even in the twentieth century.42
Dodge attempts to explain this development by contending that sovereign 
immunity is merely a matter of nonbinding comity rather than CIL.43 In 
support of that proposition, he cites language from several decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court that link immunity with comity.44 However, while the 
Court has sometimes stated that sovereign immunity “is a matter of grace and 
comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the 
Constitution,”45 it has never denied that immunity also implicates principles of 
international law. For example, it has described as one of the major purposes of 
the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) the codification of 
international law,46 and it has looked to international law and practice both in 
40. See 1 HALLECK’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-56 (G. Sherston Baker ed., 4th ed. 1908); Bradley & 
Gulati, supra note 4, at 219 & n.65. Halleck does appear to have had a narrower conception 
of the Default View than publicists like Wheaton, but that does not mean that he abandoned 
the Default View altogether.
41. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 228-29, 231-32.
42. See id. at 232.
43. Dodge, supra note 16, at 188-89.
44. See id.
45. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
46. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010) (“[O]ne of the primary purposes 
of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which Congress 
recognized as consistent with extant international law.”); Permanent Mission of India to the 
United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007) (referring to “two well-
recognized and related purposes of the FSIA: adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign 
immunity and codification of international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment”).
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construing the Act and in filling in its gaps.47 Even long before the Act, U.S. 
courts understood that sovereign immunity was governed by international 
law.48 This has also been the position of the Executive Branch.49 Other nations, 
as well as influential commentators, also understand sovereign immunity as 
governed by international law.50
Dodge’s dispute with us about the timing of the shift to the Mandatory 
View is related to his attempt to explain the shift to the Mandatory View as 
resulting from the rise of positivism in international legal theory.51 This causal 
claim, however, is insufficiently supported. At most, Dodge is able to show a 
temporal correlation between the rise of positivism and the shift to the 
Mandatory View. Correlation, however, is not causation. In addition to the 
47. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India, 551 U.S. at 200 (looking to “international practice at the 
time of the FSIA’s enactment”); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de 
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983) (looking to principles “common to both international law 
and federal common law” to address an issue relating to the application of the FSIA).
48. See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russian Federated Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 26 (N.Y. 1923) 
(“[Courts] may not bring a foreign sovereign before our bar, not because of comity, but 
because he has not submitted himself to our laws. Without his consent he is not subject to 
them.”); Hassard v. Mexico, 29 Misc. 511, 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (“It is an axiom of 
international law, of long-established and general recognition, that a sovereign State cannot 
be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission.”), aff’d, 46 
A.D. 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899).
49. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 19, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. 
Supp. 2d 284, (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05 Civ. 10270 (WHP)) (“The [FSIA] was enacted 
partly in order to bring U.S. foreign immunity law into line with prevailing international 
practice . . . and should be construed compatibly with customary international law absent a 
specific reason to the contrary.”); 2 GREEN HAYWORD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 169, at 393 (1941) (“While it is sometimes stated that [jurisdictional 
exemptions for sovereigns] are based upon international comity or courtesy, and while they 
doubtless find their origin therein, they may now be said to be based upon generally 
accepted custom and usage, i.e. international law.”).
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 
5, intro. note (1987) (“The immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
state is an undisputed principle of customary international law.”); ANTHONY AUST,
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2005) (“State immunity is a doctrine of customary 
international law.”); HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 13 (2d ed. 2008) (“That 
immunity is a rule of law is generally acknowledged by States.”). Other types of immunity, 
such as head of state immunity, are also understood by the international community to be 
governed by CIL. The International Court of Justice has stated, for example, that “in 
international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain 
holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both 
civil and criminal.” Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 3, 21-22 (Feb. 14).
51. See Dodge, supra note 16, at 182-84.
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usual difficulties with making causal historical claims, there are particular 
reasons to doubt the causal story here. As Dodge himself argues, the early 
arguments for making some CIL rules mandatory were based on natural law, 
so it is unclear why a shift away from natural law would lead to the Mandatory 
View for all of CIL. Moreover, even if positivist commentators were attempting 
to use notions of general communitarian consent to replace what had been 
addressed by natural law, as Dodge suggests,52 Dodge does not explain why 
they would preclude withdrawal rights even for CIL rules that had not 
previously been considered to fall within natural law. It is also worth noting 
that the Marshall Court was positivistic in its international law decisions and 
yet subscribed to the Default View, not the Mandatory View.53 Finally, it 
appears that Vattel contributed to the shift towards positivism in international 
legal theory and yet he provided what was probably the most influential 
intellectual support for the Default View.54
A final historical dispute between us and the respondents concerns our 
suggestion that the famous Paquete Habana decision from 1900 may have been 
influenced by the Default View.55 In that case, the Supreme Court, sitting as a 
prize court, held that the U.S. Navy was required to pay compensation to the 
owners of fishing vessels seized during the Spanish-American War because the 
seizure violated CIL. The decision is famous because the Court stated in its 
opinion that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”56 It also stated, however, that courts should apply CIL only 
“where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision,”57 and this qualification has long puzzled and divided 
commentators.
52. See id.
53. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 229-30.
54. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (1999) (“Vattel . . . is a pivotal figure in 
this shift towards positivism . . . .”); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts 
Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1112-13 (1985) (“[S]ome 
later eighteenth-century scholars such as Vattel began to elevate positive law as the basis for 
a nation’s duties under international law.”); cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO 
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 121 (2005) (“Vattel’s 
programme is to create an objective system of law by excluding natural law from it.”).
55. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 223-25.
56. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
57. Id.
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In Withdrawing, we suggested that the Court in The Paquete Habana may 
have had in mind the Default View of CIL.58 In support of this possibility, we 
noted several elements of the decision that we found suggestive: that the Court 
emphasized that the United States had continued to accept the CIL rule in 
question; that the Court relied heavily on a Marshall Court decision (Brown v. 
United States) that had reflected the Default View; that the Court relied on 
Henry Wheaton’s international law treatise, which strongly endorsed the 
Default View; and that the Court suggested that a unilateral public act by the 
U.S. government disavowing the CIL rule would be equivalent to a treaty 
exception to the rule.59 We also made clear, however, that we were “not 
arguing that this is the only possible reading of the decision—just that it is an 
available reading that becomes apparent when one understands the Default 
View that was common in the nineteenth century.”60
Nothing set forth in the responses rebuts this possibility. Dodge points out 
that the Court in The Paquete Habana refers to the “‘general consent of civilized 
nations,’”61 but that language alone seems hardly dispositive, since it does not 
preclude the possibility of a withdrawal of consent. Luban makes a better 
argument, noting that the Court referred to a controlling “judicial decision”
and that it would be strange from the perspective of separation of powers to 
think that “the judiciary has unilateral authority to opt the United States out of 
a rule of international law.”62 This proposition becomes less strange, however, 
when one considers the context of the case: it was a prize decision, a context in 
which the courts traditionally had an especially broad and independent role in 
developing the rules of international law.63 More importantly, although Luban 
does not explain how he would interpret the Court’s reference to a controlling 
“judicial decision,” it appears that he would read it as an endorsement of a 
judicial ability to place the United States in breach of international law. It is 
unclear, however, why that interpretation would be any less strange from the 
perspective of separation of powers. Indeed, the Court has long presumed that 
even Congress does not intend to place the United States in breach of 
58. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 224.
59. See id. at 223-25.
60. Id. at 225.
61. See Dodge, supra note 16, at 185 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 701, 711).
62. Luban, supra note 16, at 160.
63. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1245, 1334-38 (1996); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board The Paquete Habana: Resolving 
the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 143, 144 n.10 
(1984).
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international law,64 so there are reasons to doubt that the Court in The Paquete 
Habana was asserting a judicial ability to do so.
It bears repeating that the principal goal of our historical analysis in 
Withdrawing was to establish that the Mandatory View was not always the 
exclusive understanding of how CIL operates. It is heartening to see that the 
debate is already moving beyond that issue to address questions relating to the 
nature and extent of the Default View and the timing and circumstances of the 
shift to the Mandatory View—all questions that could undoubtedly benefit 
from additional research. In addition to its intrinsic interest, knowing more 
about this history could be useful when considering how best to improve CIL 
going forward.
ii . the mandatory view, colonialism, and new states
In Withdrawing, we attempted to trace the intellectual origins of the shift 
from the Default View of CIL to the Mandatory View. The Mandatory View is 
obviously canonical in modern writings about international law, but these 
writings do not explain its current justifications, let alone the reasons for its 
original adoption. We considered an explanation based on the rise of legal 
positivism, but found that explanation to be problematic, for the reasons 
discussed above in Part I. An alternative explanation, which we found more 
plausible, is that the Mandatory View developed in part to ensure that non-
Western countries, which were increasingly coming into the “family of 
nations” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, would be bound 
by the CIL rules that had already been worked out by the Western powers.65
We found support for this explanation in, among other things, some of the key 
early treatises that endorsed a Mandatory View (such as in Oppenheim’s 
influential 1905 treatise) and in the secondary literature that has explored the 
relevant periods.66
The historical record is complicated and difficult to assess, so we were 
tentative in our conclusions on this point. We did note, however, that this 
explanation seemed generally consistent with other practices by Western 
powers during this time period, including coercive and unequal treaty regimes 
with non-Western states.67 It also seemed consistent, we explained, with the 
post-World War II rise of the persistent objector exception to the Mandatory 
64. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
65. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 230-31.
66. See id. at 230.
67. See id. at 231.
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View, pursuant to which nations can potentially opt out of CIL rules before the 
rules develop. Under that exception, new states (such as former colonies) are 
not allowed to opt out of preexisting CIL rules, whereas Western powers can 
potentially avoid being bound by CIL developed by what was after World War 
II a rapidly growing number of non-Western regimes.68
Dodge accuses us of tarring the Mandatory View “with the brush of 
imperialism,”69 a connection that he contends is “simply false.”70 The 
Mandatory View, Dodge states conclusively, “did not develop as a tool of 
imperialism.”71 Dodge’s principal argument is that CIL, as understood in the 
nineteenth century, applied only to nations regarded as “civilized” (meaning 
generally Western, Christian nations) and that, therefore, a Mandatory View of 
CIL would not have involved the application of CIL to “uncivilized” nations. 
“Writers from Hall to Westlake to Oppenheim expressly stated,” he observes, 
“that Western rules did not bind non-Western nations without their 
consent.”72 This proposition, however, is not inconsistent with our analysis, 
and it does little to reduce the normative concerns associated with the rise of 
the Mandatory View that we articulated in Withdrawing.
As an initial matter, Dodge’s argument here is in tension with his claim 
that the mandatory elements of CIL predominated in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and also with his claim that a more general mandatory 
conception of CIL was taking hold by the middle of that century. If much of 
the world was not viewed during the nineteenth century as being bound by 
rules of CIL, then there was no Mandatory View in the universalistic sense that 
it is understood today. In any event, Dodge seems to suggest that Western 
powers were excluding non-Western powers from CIL out of respect for their 
sovereignty. In fact, it is more likely that the exclusion of the non-Western 
powers was connected to the colonial and empire-building interests of the 
time. As Kal Raustiala has explained, the exclusionary perspective “made it 
easy for empire to coexist with Westphalian territoriality and to become a 
viable and even valorized form of rule.”73 In particular, this perspective allowed 
68. See id. at 233-41.
69. Dodge, supra note 16, at 170.
70. Id. at 186.
71. Id. at 171.
72. Id. at 186.
73. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 16 (2009); see also Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal 
International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 475, 479 (2010) (“Western international lawyers and diplomats, representing their 
merchants’ interests or their states’ expansionist policies, deployed the idea of an exclusively 
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the Western powers to act in a relatively unconstrained fashion in taking over 
the lands of the uncivilized peoples.74
The writings of the international law commentators that Dodge relies on 
tend to support this less attractive narrative. John Westlake explained, for 
example, that “the occupation by uncivilised tribes of a tract, of which 
according to our habits a small part ought to have sufficed for them, was not 
felt to interpose a serious obstacle to the right of the first civilised occupant.”75
Westlake went on to connect this idea of land rights with ideas about racial 
superiority:
The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to 
cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, 
curiosity to be satisfied. If any fanatical admirer of savage life argued 
that the whites ought to be kept out, he would only be driven to the 
same conclusion by another route, for a government on the spot would 
be necessary to keep them out. Accordingly international law has to 
treat such natives as uncivilised.76
Hall and Oppenheim expressed similar positions about the taking of the land 
of indigenous peoples.77
There is no conflict between this nineteenth-century distinction between 
civilized and uncivilized states and what we suggested in Withdrawing. Our 
suggestion was based in part on the work of Antony Anghie, who has pointed 
out that, by the end of the nineteenth century, two developments were 
occurring that would have contributed to more of a universalization of 
European international law in order to justify the exclusion of non-European entities from 
the privileges of an international legal order based on sovereign equality.”).
74. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-30 (2d ed. 2004); Ruth 
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neo-Colonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 903, 937-40 (1997). Along these lines, Martti Koskenniemi explains that the 
international lawyers for the Western empires saw the pursuit of the colonial empire as “a 
perfectly natural drive; just as ownership was a projection of the owner’s person in the 
material world, colonial possession was an aspect of the healthy State’s identity and self-
respect.” MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 109 (2001).
75. JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1894).
76. Id. at 142-43.
77. See WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1880) (explaining that if a territory 
was “unappropriated by a civilised or semi-civilised state” it could be acquired through 
“occupation”); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 276 (1905) (explaining that 
occupation applied to land that was uninhabited and defining “uninhabited land” to include 
land “inhabited by natives whose community is not to be considered as a State”).
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international law.78 First, the Western powers, as a result of their many 
conquests in the uncivilized lands, had acquired a great deal of territory. 
Squabbles among these Western nations over these territories were in danger 
of escalating. Second, one of the methods of conquest had been to enter into 
treaties with many of the uncivilized nations. Recognizing those treaties was 
somewhat inconsistent with the view that the nations making the treaties were 
not covered by international law. To the extent that part of the story of the 
development of international law in the early twentieth century was about 
ensuring that these often unequal and exploitative treaties would be respected, 
one can see why it would be important to shift toward greater inclusion of the 
previously uncivilized nations (that had, as a result of the years of conquest, 
supposedly become more civilized) while also preventing them from trying to 
exit previously developed international law.79
We do not mean to suggest that there was a clean shift towards a more 
inclusionary view of the previously uncivilized nations in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, or that the desire of the Western nations to 
further their imperial agendas provides the only explanation for greater 
universalism in international law. There is evidence, for example, that jurists 
from a number of then-peripheral nations such as China and Japan were taking 
active steps to obtain greater inclusion within the system. Given the threats of
Western imperial agendas and the unequal treaties that were being imposed, 
there were benefits to learning to work within the system.80 Overall, though, 
there are strong reasons to believe that, whereas in the mid- to late nineteenth 
century it suited the colonial purposes to have the uncivilized nations excluded 
from the reach of international law, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries it was beginning to suit those same interests to have the uncivilized 
world included. Nothing in Dodge’s analysis shows otherwise.
78. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
69-82 (2004).
79. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of 
International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 20 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 10, 10 (2010) (“Recognition of some measure of sovereignty of the dominated 
polities was warranted by the need to ensure that the terms of colonial treaties would be 
honored, even though the terms of these treaties betrayed a lack of sovereignty and 
equality.”).
80. See Lorca, supra note 73, at 475 (“Faced with pressures to sign unequal treaties, elites in the 
semi-periphery realized the stakes of learning the international legal discourse.”). Another 
complicating factor that deserves further study is that, before the nineteenth century and the 
rise of imperialism, international law may have been more inclusionary with respect to 
nations like China. See Anghie, supra note 7 (contrasting Vattel’s inclusionary perspective 
regarding China with Westlake’s exclusionary perspective).
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Luban similarly challenges the Western powers explanation that we 
suggested in Withdrawing. He argues that, even assuming that we are correct in 
locating the timing of the shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View 
in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, it could not have developed 
as part of an effort to bind new states because there were not many new states 
coming into the international system at that time.81
This argument misses the thrust of our analysis. Our position is that the 
period of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries was one of transition, 
during which some nations previously excluded from the ambit of 
international law were being allowed in.82 As an illustration of this transition, 
consider the difference in identities of the nations participating in the Berlin 
Conference of 1885 and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences. At the 
Berlin Conference of 1885, fifteen “civilized” powers gathered to divide Africa 
amongst themselves.83 In 1899, at the First Hague Peace Conference, where 
issues pertaining to arms control and peace were being discussed, there were 
twenty-six participants. While they were predominantly European nations, 
they also included four Asian nations—China, Japan, Siam, and Persia.84 At the 
second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, held to continue the discussions from 
the first conference, there were forty-four participants, including the bulk of 
the Latin American republics.85 A transition away from the empire model was 
occurring, and it is not unreasonable to think that the powers of the time were 
seeking to retain control over the system.86
81. See Luban, supra note 16, at 161-62.
82. See, e.g., Anghie, supra note 54, at 36-37.
83. See William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of 
Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 325 (2001) (“The Berlin conference 
of 1884, where several European powers . . . sought the orderly partition of Africa, 
represents one of the final efforts to maintain the global status quo.”).
84. See WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1908).
85. See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROCESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 29 (4th ed. 1971) (citing the transition between the two 
Hague conferences as part of the move toward universality in international law).
86. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 510-11 (noting that Vattel’s authority was diminished at the end of 
the nineteenth century because of the “emerging social reality of new, non-Western 
nations”); see also Aceves, supra note 83, at 325 (“As colonial empires began to recede, new 
states entered the international system. International organizations also began to appear. 
Despite these developments, the European powers sought to maintain their exclusive grasp 
over the international system.”).
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Luban notes that Oppenheim endorsed the Mandatory View as early as 
1905.87 Importantly, however, Oppenheim’s 1905 treatise specifically 
emphasized that non-Western nations were increasingly coming into the 
family of nations. After observing that the Turkish Empire and Japan had 
already done so, Oppenheim explained that the status of a variety of other 
nations (including a number of Asian states) was currently “doubtful” but that 
“[m]any treaties had been concluded with them” and that “[t]hey will certainly 
succeed [in coming into the family of nations] in the near future.”88
Oppenheim also made clear that nations admitted into the family of nations 
had to accept all of the CIL rules that had already been developed.89
We should reiterate the tentative nature of our historical analysis. The 
intellectual and political history of the legal developments of the period that we 
are discussing is vast and complex, and we have considered only a small 
portion of the secondary literature. What we hope that this debate shows is the 
potential value of a more sustained historical examination of the intellectual 
origins of the Mandatory View.90 In addition to being of inherent interest, such 
an examination would help us better understand the normative underpinnings 
of the Mandatory View and thus the extent to which that View is consistent 
with contemporary normative commitments.
iii . withdrawal from treaties
In Withdrawing, we drew upon Larry Helfer’s work, which shows that 
withdrawal rights are commonly included in treaties in numerous subject areas 
of international law, even treaties reflecting important principles of 
international public policy.91 We suggested that the contrast between frequent 
and variable exit rights under treaties and a purported lack of any exit rights 
under CIL deserved further study. The contrast was particularly intriguing, we 
argued, in light of the substantial overlap that exists today between the 
87. See Luban, supra note 16, at 161.
88. OPPENHEIM, supra note 77, at 33-34.
89. Id. at 18.
90. For a suggestion along these lines, see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 28.
91. See Helfer, supra note 5; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 279 
(2d ed. 2007) (“Most multilateral treaties of unlimited duration will allow a party an 
unconditional right to withdraw.”) (emphasis omitted); Barbara Koremenos & Allison Nau, 
Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81 (2010) (explaining how the inclusion of 
withdrawal clauses in treaties can enhance cooperation and describing some of the diversity 
in such clauses).
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substantive content of treaties and CIL and the frequent use of treaties as 
evidence of CIL.
Lea Brilmayer and Isaias Tesfalidet take issue with our analysis, contending 
that analogizing to treaties “involves a serious distortion of the existing law of 
international agreements, which does not in fact grant a right of unilateral 
withdrawal.”92 They go on to explain that, although withdrawal rights under 
treaties are common, the right “almost always arises because of what both of 
the parties agreed to observe,” which means that in this context “[t]he right to 
opt out is mutual, not unilateral.”93 In support of this proposition, they cite 
and quote from various provisions in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties limiting the circumstances under which a party may unilaterally 
withdraw from a treaty when the treaty does not itself provide for a right of 
withdrawal.94
This analysis is interesting, but it does not respond to our analysis in 
Withdrawing. Our focus there was on whether a complete ban on unilateral exit 
from all rules of CIL made good sense from the perspective of institutional 
design. State preferences are relevant to that question, but it is difficult to 
obtain direct evidence of state preferences regarding withdrawal rights under 
CIL because neither the content of CIL nor its secondary rules of operation are 
typically the product of express negotiation. In the treaty context, by contrast, 
we have concrete evidence of state preferences, as reflected in the agreements 
that are made. In that context, we see that nations commonly express a 
preference for exit rights, often subject to notice periods and sometimes other 
limitations. Moreover, we see that states express this preference in the same 
subject areas that are regulated by CIL. This provides some reason to think 
that, if states were self-consciously designing a system of CIL, they would not 
disallow exit across the board.95
Pointing out that withdrawal rights in treaties are often the product of 
agreement is not responsive to this analysis because there is no such process for 
expression of preferences built into the structure of CIL. Moreover, while it is 
true that the inclusion of withdrawal clauses in treaties is (like the inclusion of 
other treaty clauses) a mutual decision, the actual exercise of withdrawal rights 
92. Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and “Withdrawal” from 
Customary International Law: An Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous Consequences, 120 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 217, 217 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/1/5/brilmayer-tesfalidet.html.
93. Id. at 218.
94. See id. at 218-21.
95. Cf. Koremenos & Nau, supra note 91, at 83 (“The process of negotiating treaty provisions is 
costly. If we assume that the signatory parties are rational actors, it follows that withdrawal 
clauses must be beneficial, or they would not appear in agreements.”).
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under such clauses is not mutual. Instead, these clauses typically allow states to 
act unilaterally in deciding whether to exit from a treaty. Nothing in the Vienna 
Convention is to the contrary: it merely provides various default rules 
concerning the circumstances under which withdrawal is allowed,96 and these 
default rules recognize that nations may choose to allow for withdrawal and 
that a right of withdrawal can even be implicit in an agreement.97
The existence of widespread, agreed-upon withdrawal rights under treaties 
also illustrates other propositions relevant to our discussion in Withdrawing. It 
suggests that there is no inherent conflict between allowing for exit and 
maintaining an international rule of law, given that exit rights under treaties 
are not viewed as presenting such a conflict.98 In addition, it shows that 
allowing for a legal right of exit does not necessarily lead to widespread abuse 
or an unraveling of international commitments, since, as far as we can tell, this 
has not happened in the treaty context.99 Furthermore, the fact that states 
commonly agree to provide for a right of unilateral exit illustrates the potential 
connection between exit rights and the ex ante decision to create international 
obligations in the first place.100 As other commentators have noted, allowing 
for exit rights or other escape clauses in treaties arguably facilitates treaty-
making by lowering the cost of commitment and providing a form of insurance 
that allows states to engage in greater experimentation.101 This invites the 
question, which we explored in Withdrawing, of whether exit rights under CIL 
might have a similar positive effect.
None of this is to say, however, that the treaty regime and the CIL regime 
are perfectly analogous, or that there is a one-to-one relationship between the 
choices that states make with respect to treaties and the choices that they would 
want to make, if given the opportunity, with respect to CIL.102 Our more 
96. Some nations such as the United States are not parties to the Vienna Convention. We will 
assume for the sake of argument that all the Convention’s default rules reflect CIL and thus 
are binding even outside of the Convention. Cf. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 5-24 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining that many provisions in the Vienna 
Convention did not reflect CIL at the time they were drafted).
97. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 54, 56, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
98. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 258.
99. See id. at 259.
100. See id. at 250-51.
101. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 5, at 1591; Koremenos & Nau, supra note 91, at 91.
102. For a consideration of potential differences between the two contexts, see Bradley & Gulati, 
supra note 4, at 270-73. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Custom: Analogies to Treaty 
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modest points are simply that the choices made in the treaty context are 
relevant when thinking about the proper design of the CIL system and that 
these choices provide some reason to question the across-the-board 
disallowance of any withdrawal rights under the Mandatory View. As a result, 
a consideration of the treaty context can be instructive when thinking about 
how best to reform and improve CIL.
iv. functional considerations
Much of Withdrawing was dedicated to considering the functional 
advantages and disadvantages of the Mandatory View. We concluded that, 
although there were arguments for restricting exit from certain types of CIL, it 
was difficult to justify a complete ban on withdrawal from all rules of CIL.103
We also suggested that allowing for some withdrawal rights had the potential 
to improve CIL in a variety of ways. Among other things, such rights would 
help states better tailor CIL to their specific needs and thus would likely 
increase both the production and use of CIL.104 Such tailoring would also have 
the potential to increase the overall quality of CIL rules, as well as CIL’s ability 
to innovate to address modern problems.105
Each of the respondents engages with our functional analysis. Their 
arguments can be grouped into two sets of considerations: first, whether the 
Mandatory View already provides nations with sufficient flexibility, and, 
second, whether a shift to the Default View would cause states to act in ways 
that are harmful to the international system.
Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 65 (2010) (considering how limitations on exit in 
the treaty area could be applied to CIL).
103. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 240-41, 263.
104. See id. at 250-51.
105. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 26-28. Carlos Vázquez suggests yet another potential 
advantage of the Default View: whereas under the current understanding of CIL a relatively 
small number of deviations could cause a CIL rule to collapse, it would be easier to maintain 
a CIL rule in the face of such dissent under the Default View. See Carlos M. Vázquez, 
Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small Portions, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
269, 283-90 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/3/1/vazquez.html. As we explained in 
Withdrawing, the ability to have a CIL rule operate in the face of dissent was one of the 
principal justifications advanced for the adoption of the persistent objector doctrine. See
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 238.
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A. Flexibility Under the Mandatory View
Both the Vázquez and Brilmayer & Tesfalidet responses recognize the 
importance of allowing nations some flexibility in making international 
commitments, but they contend that the current system of CIL already offers 
sufficient flexibility.
Vázquez asserts that our proposal of allowing increased withdrawal rights 
“differs only modestly” from the Mandatory View as it currently operates.106
To the extent that Vázquez is suggesting that the Mandatory View is not a fully 
accurate description of the current system of CIL, we agree, and we suggested 
this in Withdrawing.107 At the same time, some of Vázquez’s assertions about 
how the status quo currently operates are questionable and require more 
verification than what he has provided.
Vázquez contends that, once the limitations we suggested in Withdrawing
are factored in, withdrawal rights under the Default View would apply to “only 
a small subset of customary international law.”108 It is unclear how Vázquez 
arrived at this quantitative assessment, especially since we know that the list of 
treaty rules for which withdrawal is allowed is not a small subset.109
Ultimately, assessing the amount of CIL that would allow for withdrawal 
would require the application of a typology to specific areas of CIL, an 
106. Vázquez, supra note 105, at 369. Consistent with the Annie Hall line in its title, Vázquez’s 
paper appears to contradict itself, contending, on the one hand, that our proposal would not 
differ appreciably from the status quo and, on the other, that it would “significantly 
diminish the value of customary international law as a mechanism for regulating state 
behavior” and would make CIL “far less useful to states as a mechanism for addressing 
common problems.” Id. at 270, 285.
107. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 231-33; see also C.L. Lim & Olufemi Elias, Withdrawing 
from Custom and the Paradox of Consensualism in International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 143, 153-55 (2010) (explaining that “the Mandatory View’s explanations cloud our 
understanding of the true facts of how states actually go about recognizing customary 
rules”); Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregating Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 191, 191 (2010) (“[A]s a matter of current practice, CIL does not adhere to a single 
rule regarding exit. As a result, possibilities of exit are more abundant than many pundits 
claim.”).
108. Vázquez, supra note 105, at 271; see also id. at 276 (asserting that the list of norms that would 
allow for withdrawal would be “quite short”). In addition to noting the limitations that we 
discussed in Withdrawing, Vázquez speculates about limitations that he thinks follows from 
our analysis, but the contours of some of these suggested limitations are unclear (such as the 
idea that withdrawal should never be allowed from rules that “have value to states only if all 
or most other states adhere to them”), or rest on assumptions that we had tried to avoid in 
Withdrawing (such as the assumption that a right of withdrawal from CIL should “depend 
on the consent-based character of its rules”). See id. at 273-74.
109. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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assessment that has not yet been conducted. Our main point in Withdrawing
was simply that the number should not be zero, as maintained by the 
Mandatory View.
It is not obvious that the limitations we suggested in Withdrawing would 
disallow withdrawal rights for most of CIL. The two most significant 
limitations that we suggested were for situations in which the CIL rule 
addressed either agency issues or externalities. The first category would most 
obviously encompass jus cogens norms, which are viewed as superseding 
national decisionmaking, but this is a limited subset of CIL.110 As for CIL rules 
implicating externalities, collective action problems have meant that the major 
international externality issues have had to be resolved through treaties or 
written soft law instruments rather than the evolution of CIL.111 For these 
reasons, even if one were to categorize all the laws involving significant agency 
and externality issues under the Mandatory View, it seems likely that there 
would remain a large body of what one might call traditional CIL.
Vázquez also suggests that the ability of nations to violate CIL rules under 
the Mandatory View is similar to the ability of nations to withdraw from CIL 
rules under the Default View. He explains that if other nations acquiesce to a 
CIL violation under the Mandatory View, the violation will be “retroactively 
validated” and will not be considered as a signal of bad behavior.112 As a result, 
he argues that CIL is not much stickier under the Mandatory View than it is 
under the Default View, except that under the Default View states would “be 
able to continue to deviate even if most other states would prefer to retain the 
rule.”113
Vázquez’s argument here appears to be premised on the claim that, when 
states violate CIL under the Mandatory View, they will acknowledge their 
violation and “frame[ it] as a proposal for a change in the law.”114 We find this 
prospect unrealistic, and Vázquez provides no examples of it occurring. 
Because there is no guarantee that other states will acquiesce to a violation, 
states have little incentive under the Mandatory View to be this open about 
their position, since they run the risk of being considered a lawbreaker. Under 
110. These norms may also reflect a natural law approach to international law, in which case 
disallowing withdrawal rights for these norms would be consistent with Vattel’s view that 
CIL based on natural law should be mandatory. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
111. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 264-66.
112. Vázquez, supra note 105, at 277.
113. Id. at 278. Here Vázquez appears to be implicitly disagreeing with Luban, who argues that 
one of the virtues of the Mandatory View over the Default View is its stickiness. See infra 
note 144 and accompanying text.
114. See Vázquez, supra note 105, at 277.
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the Default View, by contrast, such openness would not create legal liability. As 
for the concern that, if withdrawal is allowed, it will mean that states would 
“be able to continue to deviate even if most other states would prefer to retain 
the rule,”115 something like this is already allowed under the current persistent 
objector doctrine, a doctrine that Vázquez purports to accept.
More generally, we question Vázquez’s apparent assumption that the 
reputational consequences of a breach of international law are identical to those 
associated with a lawful withdrawal. Certainly there does not appear to be such 
an equivalence between breach and withdrawal in the treaty context.116 Taken 
to an extreme, this equivalence argument would suggest that CIL is not 
operating as law, a proposition that we do not believe Vázquez intended to 
endorse.117
Unlike Vázquez, Brilmayer and Tesfalidet assume that the Mandatory View 
as it is described in the literature is an accurate description of the status quo, 
but they contend that this View offers sufficient flexibility. They emphasize in 
particular the existence of the persistent objector doctrine, pursuant to which 
nations are allowed to opt out of CIL rules before they become established.118
As we have explained elsewhere, a number of limitations on the persistent 
objector doctrine substantially reduce its usefulness.119 To invoke the persistent 
objector doctrine, a nation must object to an international norm before it 
“crystallizes,” yet it is often unclear when such crystallization is occurring. 
Moreover, the nation must vocally and repeatedly object to the emerging norm, 
which makes the doctrine costly in terms of inter-state friction. Such vocal 
protests also carry a risk that the objecting state will inadvertently help 
crystallize the norm, since the objections may be seen as an acknowledgment 
that the rule is forming. In addition, the persistent objector doctrine is of no 
use to a state that develops an interest in the issue only after the CIL rule 
develops (or that has its interests or circumstances change such that the rule 
becomes more problematic).120 For these and other reasons, the doctrine has 
almost never been invoked.
115. Id. at 278.
116. See Helfer, supra note 5, at 1621-29.
117. Cf. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (2005) 
(arguing that CIL “is not an exogenous influence on state behavior”).
118. See Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, at 224-25.
119. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 24-25; see also Lim & Elias, supra note 107, at 148 
(noting a number of considerations that “deprive the so-called persistent objector rule of its 
intended utility”).
120. For this reason, Andrew Guzman has argued for the allowance of subsequent objector rights 
that can be invoked when a state first develops an interest in the issue. See Guzman, supra
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The structural limitations of the persistent objector doctrine would be 
remedied under the Default View. Since nations would have the ability to be 
subsequent objectors, they would not need to police the formation of potential 
CIL rules around the globe. Nor would there be a requirement of vocal and 
repeated objections. A single clear objection would suffice, diminishing the 
amount of friction that has to be created. And a nation desiring exit would not 
need to be concerned that, by announcing its desire to exit, it was inadvertently 
helping to create a rule that it opposed.121
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet acknowledge that the persistent objector doctrine 
will not apply once a CIL rule has formed, but they contend that any argument 
for subsequent withdrawal rights must be grounded in value judgments about 
fairness or sovereignty rather than functional considerations.122 Their argument 
is that the addition of subsequent withdrawal rights cannot affect a state’s ex 
ante behavior, because the decision whether to withdraw will come up only 
after a state decides not to opt out under the persistent objector doctrine. Even 
putting aside the various limitations on the persistent objector doctrine that 
make it unlikely to be used, their argument assumes that states believe that 
their interests will remain static, which seems unlikely. If a state in fact 
understands that its interests may change over time, the state is likely to factor 
in that need for flexibility when making decisions ex ante, such as whether to 
support a CIL rule or join a treaty that might help create CIL.123
B. Effect on International Cooperation
Each of the responses contends that a shift to the Default View would 
undermine international cooperation. The purported harms associated with 
such a shift involve an increase in complexity and uncertainty in the 
note 1, at 169-71; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 253-54 (discussing Guzman’s 
argument).
121. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 24.
122. Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, at 226. Brilmayer and Tesfalidet state that we “attach 
great importance to ‘sovereignty costs.’” Id. at 229. In fact, we referred to such costs only in 
the context of arguing that the Default View might facilitate more multilateral treaty-
making by reducing the potential costs of such treaties in terms of state flexibility. See
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 262-63. We do not disagree with Brilmayer and Tesfalidet 
that states are sometimes willing to incur sovereignty costs in order to obtain commitments 
from other nations; we simply question their apparent assumption that states always favor 
commitment over flexibility.
123. Cf. Koremenos & Nau, supra note 91, at 89 (“States may not even commit themselves to an 
agreement if they anticipate circumstances will alter their expected benefits. Certain 
flexibility provisions, like duration clauses, can insure states in this context.”).
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international system, increased manipulation of the rules, the creation of gaps 
in the law, and excessive withdrawals.
1. Complexity and Uncertainty
After arguing that a shift to the Default View would not differ significantly 
from the status quo, Vázquez changes course and contends that such a shift 
would “significantly diminish the value of customary international law as a 
mechanism for regulating state behavior.”124 He first argues that allowing for 
withdrawal from some CIL rules would increase the complexity of CIL. While 
he acknowledges that withdrawal rights are common in treaties,125 he contends 
that treaty law is better situated to absorb the increased complexity that comes 
with allowing for such rights because, unlike CIL, treaty provisions are 
typically set forth in an agreed-upon written document.126 By contrast, he says, 
the Default View for CIL would “introduc[e] significant indeterminacies and 
complexities that would adversely affect the efficacy of its norms.”127
As an initial matter, it is not clear to us how much complexity in a body of 
law is too much, and Vázquez does not suggest any metric for making such an 
assessment. CIL as currently understood has a variety of secondary rules about 
its formation, and none of them is written down. Moreover, a number of these 
rules, such as the rules concerning the amount, type, and duration of state 
practice that is needed in order to generate a CIL rule, are highly uncertain. In 
addition, the secondary rules of CIL have not remained constant. The 
development of the persistent objector doctrine, for example, appears to be a 
relatively recent phenomenon.128 Moreover, CIL does not currently have just 
one exit rule, as Vázquez appears to assume. For example, although states can 
use treaties to exit (as between themselves) from most rules of CIL, this is not 
true for jus cogens norms. Going in the opposite direction, the development of 
regional CIL (also sometimes referred to as “special” CIL) is understood as 
124. Vázquez, supra note 105, at 270.
125. See id. at 285-86.
126. See id. at 286-87.
127. Id. at 288. Vázquez relies in this part of his analysis on Tom Franck’s theory that 
international law’s efficacy stems from its “compliance pull.” See id. at 286. Although not 
material to our analysis, it is worth noting that this theory has been criticized from a variety 
of perspectives. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 231 (2009); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1834-35 (2002); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and 
International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 493 (1997).
128. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 238-39.
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requiring the unanimous consent of the states to which it applies.129
Furthermore, as discussed above, Dodge potentially introduces yet another 
category of rules that fall within the “comity” label, in which there may be no 
limits on withdrawal. Vázquez does not raise any complaints about the 
additional complexity created by having those additional categories.
It is also worth noting that there is nothing preventing the codification of 
the secondary rules of CIL, including withdrawal rights, which would 
presumably reduce their uncertainty. This is eventually what happened with 
the secondary rules of treaty law, which until the modern era were all 
addressed through unwritten CIL. In another article, we have described the 
kind of research and activities that might produce such a codification, and we 
would welcome Vázquez and the other respondents to join us in that project.130
Vázquez is also worried that if withdrawal rights were allowed, CIL “would 
degenerate into an unfathomably complex patchwork of essentially bilateral 
legal relationships.”131 Such degeneration, however, would depend in part on 
the extent of withdrawals. As explained in Withdrawing, there are reasons to 
predict that withdrawals would not be extensive under the Default View.132 In 
any event, as Vázquez acknowledges, this sort of complexity is common in the 
treaty area and is not thought to seriously undermine the value of that body of 
international law. While it is true that treaty withdrawals are by definition 
public events—a fact that helps clarify the particular interstate relationships—
that would also be true of withdrawals from CIL under the Default View. 
Nations would need to announce publicly their prospective withdrawal in 
order to avoid a default rule of CIL, so other nations would have full notice, 
just as they do for treaty withdrawals.
In fact, the public notice aspect of the Default View would likely increase the 
clarity of CIL, and that potential effect would need to be weighed against a 
potential increase in complexity. Under the current Mandatory View, nations 
typically do not publicly acknowledge that they are deviating from a rule of 
CIL. Instead, they argue about the content of CIL or act surreptitiously. To 
invoke withdrawal rights under the Default View, by contrast, nations would 
need to announce publicly their deviation and describe the CIL rule from 
129. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (6th ed. 2008) (“While in the case of a 
general customary rule the process of consensus is at work so that a majority or a substantial 
minority of interested states can be sufficient to create a new custom, a local custom needs 
the positive acceptance of both (or all) parties to the rule.”).
130. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 15 (discussing the process used to produce the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties).
131. Vázquez, supra note 105, at 285.
132. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 258-60.
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which they were exiting. In light of that informational value of the Default 
View, it is not clear that the regime that we are suggesting would be 
substantially more uncertain or complex than what already exists under 
treaties, which not only typically allow for withdrawals but also often permit 
reservations that further complicate the web of relationships.
2. Manipulation
Dodge contends that the Mandatory View is justified on the ground that 
having an additional category of CIL that allows for withdrawal would add 
uncertainty to the system and lead to manipulation.133 He further contends that 
although flexibility is desirable in international relations, sufficient flexibility 
already exists by virtue of having some international norms fall within a 
nonbinding “comity” category rather than within the category of CIL.134
There is tension between Dodge’s defense of the category of comity and his 
argument that having additional categories beyond the mandatory category of 
CIL poses a risk of manipulation. As our debate with him over the status of 
sovereign immunity shows,135 his concern about the uncertainty that can be 
generated by multiple categories applies to the current system he is defending.
Perhaps more importantly, his defense of comity reveals that, like us, he 
believes that nations should have some ability to exit from at least some 
international norms (something that is allowed within the comity category). 
The comity category that he defends, however, offers none of the limitations 
and protections that could be applied under the Default View of CIL, such as 
requirements of prospectivity and advance notice.136
In any event, while it is almost tautologically true that having an additional 
category can increase uncertainty and thus the possibility of manipulation, that 
argument could be made about any system of law that has some mandatory 
rules. Nevertheless, we find that this argument is not considered a persuasive 
reason against having nonmandatory rules in other contexts. In corporate and 
contract law, for example, where there are both default and mandatory rules, 
there are frequent debates about how to categorize particular rules. Despite 
decades of robust discussion in the literature over default versus mandatory 
rules, however, we are unaware of any serious argument in favor of having the 
133. Dodge, supra note 16, at 190-91.
134. See id. at 187-88.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
136. For other potential limitations that could be encompassed within the Default View of CIL, 
see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 254-75.
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entire system covered by a set of mandatory rules, just so that there can be no 
uncertainty about categorization.
Dodge says that “history suggests some reasons to worry” about 
manipulation of CIL categories,137 but he does not point to any serious 
problems of manipulation arising from the Default View in the nineteenth 
century. He refers to Ware v. Hylton, but then acknowledges that the Supreme 
Court correctly categorized the CIL rule in that case.138 He contends that the 
Court in Schooner Exchange “engaged in its own manipulation” because it 
assumed a right of withdrawal for the CIL rule there—immunity for a foreign
state’s warships—whereas under Vattel’s scheme there would not have been a 
right of withdrawal.139 In fact, Vattel never addressed the issue of immunity for 
warships, and Chief Justice Marshall correctly noted that the Court was 
“exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids from precedents or written 
law.”140 That is all the history that Dodge musters on this point.
Another problem with the manipulation argument is that the Mandatory 
View is itself structured in a way that encourages manipulation. Under that 
view, instead of invoking a right of formal exit (as nations do under treaty 
regimes), nations dissemble, argue about the content of CIL, and engage in 
surreptitious violations.141 It is unclear why that sort of behavior is preferable 
to allowing formal exit, which at least provides the system with clear notice of a 
nation’s position. As discussed in Withdrawing, in a legal system that is heavily 
dependent on reputation and retaliation for its enforcement, as is true for 
international law, the availability of such information about the expectations 
and behavior of the actors is particularly beneficial.142 A system of formal exit as 
opposed to manipulation of extant CIL rules is also more consonant with rule 
of law values.143
137. Dodge, supra note 16, at 190.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). The Court also 
correctly observed that, even for ambassadorial immunity, Vattel himself relied in part on 
reasoning grounded in tacit consent. See id. at 143; see also supra note 31 and accompanying 
text.
141. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 261-62; see also Samuel Estreicher, A Post-Formation 
Right of Withdrawal from Customary International Law?: Some Cautionary Notes, 21 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 57, 59 (2010) (discussing the “law-speak afforded by CIL”).
142. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 259-60.
143. See id. at 262; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 17 (“[A] system of de jure exit is 
more consonant with rule of law values than a system of de facto exit and thereby has the 
potential to enhance CIL’s legitimacy.”).
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3. Possibility of No Law
Luban contends that if nations are allowed to withdraw from rules of CIL, 
the result will be no law at all on particular subjects, and he is particularly 
concerned that this legal lacuna will emerge with respect to the CIL governing 
the laws of war. As a result, he contends that the “stickiness” of CIL—
something that we discussed in Withdrawing—is a virtue. “[T]here are a few 
reactionaries among us,” he says, “who think that this particular inefficiency is 
a good thing.”144
Although we briefly addressed the issue of gaps in the law in 
Withdrawing,145 we were not particularly focused on the laws of war. We did 
note, however, that CIL in this area might need updating in light of changes in 
the nature of armed conflict.146 This observation has been made by others and 
we did not view it as particularly controversial.147 Luban, however, suggests 
that, even if CIL governing the laws of war is outdated, allowing for 
withdrawal from this CIL will lead to “detainee mistreatment and civilian 
casualties.”148
We understand Luban’s concerns, but we think that they are overstated. To 
the extent that there are CIL rules governing the treatment of individuals 
during armed conflict, these rules presumably developed because they were in 
the mutual interest of nations likely to engage in conflict, and this would be 
true whether there was a right of withdrawal or not. Relatedly, almost all 
nations have ratified the Geneva Conventions, and, even though those 
Conventions allow for withdrawal, nations have chosen to stay within the 
treaties.149 Luban does not explain why the calculus would be different for CIL.
Luban may have in mind that there are certain norms—for example, the 
norm against torture—that should operate without regard to national consent. 
For such norms, moral and other considerations might suggest that nations 
cannot even enter into treaties altering the norms. There is in fact a category of 
144. Luban, supra note 16, at 164.
145. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 272-73.
146. See id. at 247-48.
147. Luban acknowledges that “a number of commentators have suggested that these rules are 
outdated because they are not adapted to asymmetrical conflicts.” Luban, supra note 16, at 
163.
148. Id. at 164.
149. See, e.g., International Humanitarian Law—State Parties/Signatories, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Mar. 7, 
2011) (listing the 194 states that are parties to the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War).
mandatory versus default rules
451
international norms that is said to operate this way—the small category of jus 
cogens norms—and this category is generally thought to include a prohibition 
on torture. As explained in Withdrawing, there are strong arguments for 
treating jus cogens norms as mandatory,150 so in this respect there may be little 
disagreement between us and Luban.
As for stickiness, we did not argue in Withdrawing that stickiness is always 
a drawback. Instead, we argued that CIL was likely to be sticky even under the 
Default View.151 There are a variety of reasons for this, such as network effects, 
learning externalities, first-mover problems, and the phenomenon of 
bureaucratic entrenchment that Luban himself discusses.152 As a result, 
concerns about excessive withdrawals from CIL rules under the Default View
are probably unrealistic.153 If so, then creating additional stickiness through a 
complete disallowance of exit is less necessary for deterring harmful behavior 
than Luban assumes. Again, however, jus cogens norms may be a sensible 
exception.
Luban was a vociferous critic of the Bush Administration’s approach to the 
war on terror,154 and it may be that he is worried that CIL withdrawal rights 
would legitimize such an approach. Importantly, however, the Bush 
Administration’s approach had nothing to do with the Default View of CIL. 
Instead, it was based on the claim that much of the laws of war simply did not 
apply to a conflict with a worldwide terrorist organization.155 As discussed 
above, this sort of argumentation is unfortunately encouraged by the 
Mandatory View of CIL. By contrast, to invoke withdrawal rights under the 
Default View, a nation would be required to publicly announce that it no 
longer accepted the international legal principle in question, something that 
the Bush Administration showed no inclination to do with respect to the laws 
of war. Indeed, the Administration repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to 
150. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 267-68, 273.
151. See id. at 246-47.
152. See Luban, supra note 16, at 165.
153. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 246, 258-59.
154. See, e.g., David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 219 (Mark Tushnet ed.,
2005); David Luban, Forget Nuremberg: How Bush’s Torture Bill Eviscerates the Promise of 
Nuremberg, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2006, 5:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2150396.
155. See, e.g., Memorandum from President George W. Bush for Vice President et al., Humane 
Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. With respect to 
the military detention of terrorist suspects, the Obama administration’s position is similar to 
that of the Bush administration. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).
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both the international law prohibition on torture and the Geneva Conventions, 
while at the same time engaging in the conduct that Luban has criticized.156 In 
light of the structural inability of the Mandatory View to address this sort of 
problem, it is not clear why Luban is defending the status quo approach to 
CIL.
4. Excessive Withdrawals
Under the Mandatory View, violations of CIL are understood to be a 
method of altering and improving the existing rules. As a result, violations are 
not inherently a sign of bad behavior. Under the Default View, by contrast, 
violations are more likely to indicate bad behavior because a violation means 
that the nation was unwilling to acknowledge its true position with respect to 
the CIL rule in question.157
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet do not disagree with this analysis but are 
concerned that we may end up with the reverse problem: if withdrawal is not 
an inherent sign of being a bad state, bad states might engage in 
withdrawals.158 As we suggested in Withdrawing, however, there are reasons to 
believe that bad states will be less willing to invoke withdrawal rights than 
good states.159 Among other things, it is likely that good states will be able to 
articulate better and more credible explanations for withdrawals and thus avoid 
negative reputational effects that might otherwise be associated with 
withdrawal. In any event, even if bad states make the effort to mimic good 
states in this regard, the result will be that more information gets revealed, 
which would have positive effects over the status quo.160
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet also suggest that we are being inconsistent in 
claiming that, even under the Default View, there will be reputational 
incentives not to withdraw from rules of CIL.161 We do not see the 
inconsistency. Brilmayer and Tesfalidet appear to assume that only behavior 
that violates a legal norm can generate negative reputational consequences, but 
156. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much Lawyering 
and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 59 (2009) (“[M]ost of [the 
Bush Administration’s] positions did not involve repudiations of international law.”).
157. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 261.
158. See Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, at 228.
159. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 261.
160. See id. at 262, 271-72.
161. See Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, at 228-29.
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this is incorrect.162 Most social norms, for example, are not embodied in law,
but their violation can nevertheless have reputational consequences. That 
reputation and legality are not perfectly coordinated in international relations is 
illustrated by two examples: NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia in the 
late 1990s was probably illegal, but it did not undermine NATO’s reputation in 
most circles (and may have enhanced it).163 By contrast, North Korea’s 
purported withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 may 
have been legal, since the treaty expressly allows for withdrawal, but it likely 
had a negative effect on North Korea’s (already low) reputation.164
Vázquez makes a related argument, contending that an allowance of 
withdrawal rights would reduce the value of CIL to each state because it would 
lower the likelihood that other states would remain bound to the rule and that 
such rights would therefore reduce state investment in creating CIL.165 As 
explained in Withdrawing, there are a number of reasons to believe that 
allowing withdrawal rights would not lead to a large number of exits.166 In any 
event, while it is essentially a truism that withdrawal rights would make CIL 
less prospectively binding, Vázquez does not take account of the additional 
flexibility that each state also receives, which in turn makes the CIL rule less 
costly and thus potentially more attractive to each state ex ante. Importantly, 
we know that when states consider the balance between flexibility and 
commitment in the treaty context, they often choose the flexibility of 
withdrawal rights, and the ability to make that choice likely facilitates 
investments in treaty-making.167 Vázquez does not explain why, for CIL, the 
balance always favors commitment over flexibility.
162. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 5, at 1623-24 (explaining how lawful decisions not to ratify 
treaties or to withdraw from treaties can have negative reputational effects).
163. We raised this example in Withdrawing. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 260. 
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet take issue with the example on the ground that the NATO 
countries were not invoking a right of withdrawal. See Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, 
at 227 n.37. We were not claiming, however, that this was an example of withdrawal; our 
claim was that, under the current Mandatory View, violations of CIL do not inherently send 
a negative signal.
164. See Helfer, supra note 5, at 1619. For additional discussion of the complicated relationship 
between international law and reputation, see Brewster, supra note 127.
165. See Vázquez, supra note 105, at 288-89.
166. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 245-46.
167. See Helfer, supra note 5, at 1599.
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conclusion
If CIL is to continue operating as a significant body of international law, its 
problems must be addressed. While we do not claim that the Default View is a 
panacea, allowing for broader withdrawal rights under CIL has the potential to 
facilitate innovation in CIL, while also increasing the flow of information and 
enhancing CIL’s legitimacy. There may of course be other ways to improve CIL 
that we have not considered, and we would be happy to see this debate prompt 
additional proposals for reform. We share the instinct of some of our 
respondents that a shift to the Default View, to be done effectively, would 
likely require a concerted effort from the major players in the international 
system along with contributions from academics. Experience with prior efforts 
to codify the secondary rules of international law, such as with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, suggests that a project of this nature is 
feasible over the long term. In the meantime, this debate has revealed fruitful 
areas of research that will help deepen our understanding of both the history 
and operation of CIL.
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